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Abstract
COVID-19 has resulted in unprecedented social distancing policies be-
ing enforced worldwide. As governments urgently seek to reopen society,
there is a demand for technologies that may alleviate the requirement
for social distancing whilst also protecting healthcare services and main-
taining human and civil rights. In this work we explore the controversial
technique of so-called immunity passports and present SecureABC: a de-
centralised, privacy-preserving system for issuing and verifying antibody
certificates. We consider the implications of immunity passport systems,
develop a set of general principles and security requirements for their de-
ployment and show that these may be satisfied in practice.
1 Introduction
Governments worldwide are currently dealing with the Coronavirus pandemic,
an outbreak of the SARS-CoV-2 virus which has already resulted in over 340,000
deaths [3] and has caused unprecedented social changes for billions of people
worldwide. Most countries have responded to the pandemic with policies aimed
at enforcing social distancing, a technique certain to suppress the transmission
of the virus when it is applied uniformly to the whole population [10]. Whilst
effective, social distancing measures come at a significant social and economic
cost and may not be a feasible long-term policy option in many countries. In ad-
dition it has been noted that the approach may have a disproportionate impact
on disadvantaged groups in society [15]. As the effective reproduction rate (Rt)
is reduced below 1.0, and the number of COVID-19 cases falls, there are clear
benefits to governments reducing the scope of population-wide social distancing
and seeking technologies that may alleviate the requirement for social distanc-
ing whilst also protecting healthcare services and maintaining human and civil
rights. In particular, measures such as intensive testing, contact tracing and
selective isolation have been proposed [5].
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A promising, but controversial [13], technique for relaxing the need for pop-
ulation wide social distancing is the use of so-called “immunity passports” or
“risk-free certificates”. The general idea is that a test for antibodies to SARS-
CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, could serve as the basis for a passport
document that frees an individual from the most restrictive social distancing
regulations. Assuming that strong correlates of protection to SARS-CoV-2 can
be identified, immunity passports could provide a key technology in enabling
the transition away from total lockdown. Chile has already announced plans
to issue such passports [2] and key policy makers in the UK and Germany are
also considering the approach [7]. In light of the interest already shown by sev-
eral governments, and the emergence of a number of commercial solutions, an
academic consideration of immunity passports is called for.
We note that immunity passports are a highly controversial technology that
has received criticism from many influential organisations including the World
Health Organisation (WHO) [13]. We do not claim to advocate the use of
immunity passports as this is a complex policy decision that should only be
considered, on a case-by-case basis, after involving all of the relevant stakehold-
ers and experts. We do however think that it is important to provide a detailed
solution to the problem that can be used to properly inform any such decision.
We complement our solution with a presentation of four general deployment
principles which aim to mitigate many of the concerns surrounding immunity
passports.
Our contributions
1. We provide a framework of general principles and a set of security and
privacy requirements for immunity passport systems. Our general princi-
ples aim to alleviate some of the major concerns relating to such systems,
and our requirements provide the basis for ensuring such systems have the
right properties and can be evaluated on common terms.
2. We present SecureABC, a decentralised and privacy-preserving solution
for antibody certificates which is both designed in accordance with our
general principles and that meets the our security and privacy require-
ments.
3. We show that SecureABC is efficient and practical with our proof of con-
cept implementation.
Outline First in Section 2 we review the concerns surrounding immunity pass-
ports and derive four general principles that may minimise the risk posed by
these systems. Next, in Section 3 we define our protocol model and introduce
our cryptographic primitives. Section 4 presents the full details of our Secure-
ABC antibody certificate system. Then, in Section 5 we define our desired
security properties for immunity passports and then evaluate SecureABC with
respect to them. Section 6 shows the results of our implementation. Finally,
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we review related work and other solutions in Section 7 before concluding in
Section 8.
2 General Principles for Immunity Passports
In this section we build towards presenting some general principles for deploying
an immunity passport system. We first present the general use case for immu-
nity passports, before citing the major concerns which have been raised. Our
motivation for providing this section is to address concerns that immunity pass-
port systems may prove to be counter productive and could have a net negative
impact on society. Evidence is mounting that many nations [2, 7] are at least
considering immunity passport solutions, so it is important that techniques for
minimising the risk posed by such systems are considered.
Basic use case The use case we will use to begin our discussion is one in
which citizens wishing to travel on public transport are required to present a
certificate affirming that they have some level of protective immunity to the
SARS-CoV-2 virus. In more detail, a healthcare provider will test citizens for
antibodies to COVID-19. If antibodies are found then a so-called immunity
passport will be issued issued. The citizen will now present their passport to
the transport service provider who, after establishing the authenticity of the
certificate, will allow access to transportation.
Immunity passport concerns Immunity passports have attracted signifi-
cant criticism, including from the WHO [13]. The main concerns we are aware
of are as follows:
1. Alterations to scientific advice. As a novel disease, COVID-19 is not
yet well understood by the scientific community [12]. For example, the
WHO’s main concern is that the presence of antibodies is not an accurate
indicator of immunity citing that such tests “need further validation to
determine their accuracy and reliability” [13].
2. Is discriminatory. Such a system will create an attribute for discrimina-
tion [26], creating a clear distinction between those with ‘immunity’ and
those without. The Ada Lovelace Institute report emphasises this [22]:
“Discrimination and stigmatisation may become commonplace if immu-
nity becomes an element of identity.” This inequality would be exagger-
ated if tests were not universally and freely available to all — immunity
passports, and the associated benefits, could be a luxury of the rich.
3. Incentivises people to get the virus. Those with immunity passports
will be allowed access to “the post-lockdown world” while those without
could remain subject to social distancing policy. An immunity passport
could become synonymous with freedom, creating a strong incentive for
people to attempt to obtain a passport. Coupled with the belief that
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having (and surviving) the virus corresponds to gaining immunity [20, 18],
it is hypothesised that immunity passports could actively encourage people
to try to become infected.
4. Feature creep by governments. Governments are currently exercis-
ing an abnormal level of control and surveillance over their populations
[11]. Passporting systems could provide authorities with an opportunity
to implement technologies, and to collect data, that could have long-term
negative consequences on society [22].
These concerns are persuasive in advocating against immunity passports in
the basic use case setting which we have described. We are therefore motivated
to address these concerns with a set of general principles which aim to mitigate
the risks associated with immunity passports.
General principles for immunity passports
1. Rename, educate and revocate. Until there is strong evidence of
protective immunity to COVID-19, the word “immunity” should not be
used. This is misleading at best and dangerously inaccurate at worst —
creating a false sense of security. We opt for “antibody certificate” as
it reflects the function more accurately. Moreover, appropriate levels of
public education with regard the benefits and limitations of such systems
is vital. Indeed, the Information Commissioners Office (ICO) strongly
advocate the principle of being transparent about the purpose and benefit
of the closely related contact tracing technology [21]. Finally, we call
for systems which support efficient and fast revocation of certificates and
service providers. This is essential to maintain pace with the fast changing
scientific understanding and dynamic policies which relate to COVID-19.
2. Access to testing and technology. Wealth, location and demographic
profile must not impact access to obtaining or using a certificate. In other
words, beyond their specified purpose, antibody certificates must avoid
any additional discrimination. In the case of contact tracing, the ICO state
that “special consideration for different societal groups” is paramount.
Moreover the Lovelace report [22] calls for “measures for ensuring vulner-
able groups are not excluded from the operation of the system”.
3. No restrictions based on test results. The Lovelace report recom-
mends the development of a strategy for “how immunity certification will
be integrated into policy . . . pertaining to travel, movement, work and
schooling.” We advocate that such strategy should minimise any restric-
tion of access to movement or provision of services. The resulting system
will be less discriminatory1 and therefore will present less incentive to get
the virus.
1Without this the system potentially discriminates against those who have acted respon-
sibly during the lockdown period, have not contracted the virus, and therefore are less likely
to test positive for antibodies.
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4. Maintain user ownership of data. An antibody certificate system
should be designed in such a way that users can, at all times, control the
use of their data. In particular, users must control when and where to use
their data to demonstrate their test result. This is supported by the ICO’s
principle of “giving users control” [21] with regard to contact tracing.
These principles may appear to reduce the functionality of any antibody
certificate system that is in accordance with them. To alleviate this concern
we present two additional use cases that are both in accordance with these
principles and which may still benefit society:
Use case 2: indicating user risk. Consider the use case given at the start
of the section where users of the public transport are required to show their cer-
tificate before making a journey. Under our general principles we advocate that
certificates are still checked, however access is granted to all. In this scenario,
antibody certificates can still provide a benefit by allowing testing, cleaning and
other mitigatory techniques to be optimised based on the relative use of each
service by untested or tested-negative citizens.
Use case 3: helping vulnerable members of society. When providing
food delivery services for elderly people who cannot safely leave their home,
preferring (based a task scheduling algorithm) the carrier to hold an antibody
certificate could provide a way to reduce the risk faced by the recipient. This
scenario could represent a reasonable trade-off between restricting access to work
and minimising the risk faced by vulnerable groups.
3 Model and Preliminaries
Here we begin the technical part of our paper by first defining the model for our
antibody certificate protocol and then introducing the cryptographic primitives
we require.
3.1 Model
Our antibody certificate scheme model comprises three parties. We denote the
Healthcare provider as Harry (H), the citizen or user of the scheme as Alice
(A) and the service provider, who Verifies user certificates, as Verity (V). Our
general protocol model is outlined in Figure 1. In step (1) A gets tested for
antibodies by H. In step (2) H records the result of the test in a certificate
which is sent to A. In step (3) A presents her certificate to V and then finally, in
step (4), V checks the authenticity and attributes of the certificate to ensures it
corresponds to A (e.g. by matching a photo and name to A). Our system model
assumes a root of trust in the system (e.g. the government) that authorises
both H and V as legitimate entities.
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Figure 1: Our general model of an antibody certificate scheme run between a
healthcare provider, a user and a service provider.
In our SecuereABC antibody certificate scheme, which we present in Section
4, we map these steps into three protocol phases: an initial setup phase where
H generates the public and private system parameters, an issue phase corre-
sponding to steps (1) and (2) where A is tested and issued with a certificate by
H and finally an authentication phase corresponding to steps (3) and (4) where
A’s certificate is verified by V.
3.2 Preliminaries
Our SecureABC antibody certificate scheme requires a secure public key signa-
ture scheme as well as a secure public key encryption scheme. Both of these
schemes are made up of three algorithms. The first algorithm generates a public
key pair, the second either signs or encrypts and the third verifys the signa-
ture or decrypts the ciphertext, respectively. We denote the signature scheme
by the tuple (key-gensign , sign, verify) and the encryption scheme by the tuple
(key-genenc , enc, dec).
We use the signature scheme to allow the healthcare provider to sign an-
tibody certificates and therefore, intuitively, we require the signature scheme
to be unforgeable. Specifically we require it to be EUF-CMA (Existential Un-
forgeability under Chosen Message Attack) secure [19]. Rather than define this
property here, we refer the reader to Goldwasser et al. [19] for the standard def-
inition. We note that the standard Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA) [16] is a sufficient instantiation for our needs.
We use the encryption scheme in the authentication phase between the user
and the service provider. The user will encrypt their signed certificate such that
only an authorised service provider can decrypt it. Our particular use of the
encryption scheme means that any public key encryption scheme that is at least
IND-CPA secure will suffice. For a standard definition of IND-CPA refer the
reader to Katz and Lindell [24] .
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4 SecureABC
In this section we present SecureABC, our antibody certificate scheme that
realises the model defined in Section 3. SecureABC is a distributed, privacy-
preserving antibody certificate protocol that allows for both paper-based and
app-based user credentials. Providing printable, paper-based credentials is im-
portant because even in the most developed countries, the adoption of smart-
phones is not absolute. Indeed, requiring the use of electronic devices may
exclude vulnerable user groups [15] and limit the reach of any deployment. We
seek to provide strong privacy guarantees regardless of whether a user has a
device capable of displaying a digital passport or not. In particular we seek to
replicate the privacy of traditional identity documents, such as driver’s licenses,
which do not notify the issuer each time they are presented.
As noted in Section 3 our model assumes a common trust anchor, such as
the government, that authorises both H and V as legitimate entities. In practice
this means that every H or V generate a new public key, the government signs
it to indicate that it can be trusted.
High level overview of SecureABC The SecureABC protocol comprises
three phases: Setup, Issue and Authentication. The Setup protocol is run by
Harry, who generates the public key pair for the signature scheme he will use to
sign antibody certificates. Next, the Issue phase is run between Harry and Al-
ice. At the end of the Issue phase Alice receives an antibody certificate, signed
by Harry, which she can use to demonstrate her antibody status to service
providers. Finally, the Authentication phase is run between Alice and Verity.
The authentication phase allows Verity to convince Alice that they are an au-
thorised service provider, and allows Alice to convince Verity that she has a
valid antibody certificate from Harry. We provide two Authentication phase
sub-protocols which allow Alice to choose between using either a paper-based
or app-based credential.
4.1 The SecureeABC Protocol
The Setup, Issue and Authentication phases of the SecureABC protocol are as
follows.
Setup: Harry initialises the list of revoked CID numbers rev = ∅ and generates
the public and private key for the signature scheme.
(pkH , skH)← key-gensign(·)
Issue: Harry interacts with Alice to issue a signed antibody certificate.
1. Alice is tested for antibodies by Harry, who records the test identity num-
ber (TID) that produced the test result. If the test is positive for anti-
bodies, and Alice has not already been issued a certificate, then Harry
7
generates a random Certificate ID (CID), initialises a corresponding re-
vocation bit bCID = False and specifies a validity period dateCID. Harry
stores (CID,TID, bCID, dateCID, commCID) in a private database
2. Alice provides Harry with a photograph, photoA, and a communication
channel, commA, which will be used to send passport status updates (e.g.
upon revocation or test recall). In practice, Alice will choose one of a
small number of communication options such as SMS, email or post.
3. Harry prepares and sends Alice the signed antibody certificate certA which
is computed as follows:
certA = signpkH (nameA, photoA, dateCID,CID)
Authentication Alice interacts with Verity to demonstrate the authenticity
and ownership of her antibody certificate. Authentication must be mutual, that
is first Alice must be convinced that Verity is authorised by the government
before allowing her to verify her certificate. Since SecureABC allows Alice to
present either a paper-based or app-based certificate, we require two different
authentication sub-protocols which correspond to the manual and automated
authentication of Verity by Alice, respectively. In both authentication sub-
protocols, Verity runs an app which she uses to scan and verify Alice’s credential.
The app also periodically downloads and verifies the list of revoked CID numbers
rev and Harry’s public key pkH .
Paper-Based Authentication: Alice has certA and Verity has the list of
revoked CID numbers rev and the Harry’s public key pkH .
1. Alice must manually convince herself that Verity is a government-authorised
service provider (e.g. based on context or viewing an identity document).
If this step fails Alice aborts the protocol.
2. Alice shows her certificate certA to Verity.
3. Verity verifies certA. That is she confirms verify(pkH , certA) = 1, and
learns (nameA, photoA, dateCID, CID). She checks that CID has not been
revoked i.e. CID /∈ rev, then compares photoA to Alice and ensures
that dateCID has not elapsed. Optionally, Verity may ask to see a second
document bearing nameA.
App-Based Authentication Protocol: Alice runs an app that stores her
antibody certificate certA and which periodically downloads and verifies a list
of revoked verifier public keys, revV , from the government. Verity has a list of
revoked CID numbers, Harry’s public key pkH and also an encryption public
key pair (pkV , skV )← key-genenc(·).
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1. Verity sends pkV to Alice. In practice, Alice uses the app to scan a QR
code or read an NFC tag provided by Verity. Alice verifies pkV is an
authorised public key and is not on the revocation list, i.e. pkV /∈ revV .
If either of these fail then Alice aborts the protocol.
2. Alice computes cert′A = enc(pkV , certA) which is converted to a QR code
and scanned by Verity.
3. Verity decrypts Alice’s certificate certA = dec(skV , cert
′
A) and then pro-
ceeds as in Step 3 of the paper-based authentication protocol.
If either the paper-based or app-based authentication protocol succeeds then
Verity accepts Alice’s antibody certificate, otherwise she does not.
5 Security Properties and Evaluation
This section first presents the main technical security properties we require of
an antibody certificate protocol before evaluating our SecureABC scheme with
respect to them.
5.1 Desired Security Properties
In this work we do not pursue a rigorously defined, formal definition for every
requirement but rather we intend to provide an unambiguous set of terms for
evaluating antibody certificate systems. It is unlikely that any scheme can
simultaneously satisfy all of of these properties as several of them present a
trade-off. For example, there is an inherent compromise between the anonymity
of user certificates and the binding between the user and their certificate. We
provide some additional intuition after the definition of each term.
Correctness: If all parties are honest, the service provider will be able to
view the certificate produced by the healthcare provider for the user at the
end of an execution of protocol. — Correctness ensures that the protocol
computes the expected functionality.
Soundness: A user cannot create a valid certificate alone. — In other words
an adversarial user cannot forge a valid certificate.
User-Cert Binding: The only certificate a user can successfully use is the
one that is assigned to them and which has not been revoked. — This
prevents a user from swapping their certificate with that of another user
and then succeeding in using it.
Uniqueness: A user can have at most one valid certificate associated to them
at any one time. — This property is important when User-Cert Binding
is imperfect, for example when considering twins who may share a similar
photograph but that may not share the same antibody test result.
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Cert-Attribute Binding: The value of the attributes associated with a cer-
tificate cannot be altered by the user. — In other words, the certificate
must be tamper proof.
Peer Indistinguishability: We define a peer as an unauthorised service
provider (for example, a malicious citizen). We require that a peer can-
not learn any information about the user from viewing the certificate. —
Intuitively, Peer Indistinguishability ensures that a user cannot be pres-
sured into revealing their certificate by anyone except authorised service
providers, this alleviates the “bully on the bus” problem.
User-Auth unlinkability:
1. (From healthcare provider) The healthcare provider cannot link a user
to their authentication phase interactions.
2. (From service provider) The service provider cannot link a user to an
authentication phase interaction.
This property prevents the healthcare and the service provider, respec-
tively, from learning when and where a users certificate is authorised.
Revocation of certificates: A users certificate can be revoked. — Certifi-
cates may be invalidated in the following situations:
Loss/Stolen: If a certificate becomes lost or compromised.
Error: If a batch of tests are recalled because they were incorrect.
Misuse: If evidence of certificate misuse is presented.
Revocation of service providers: A service provider can be revoked from
the list of authorised providers. — An authorised service provider may be
revoked in the following situations:
Change of policy: A change in government policy may mean some
service providers are no longer authorised.
Sanctioning: If a service provider is deemed to not be following recom-
mended guidelines it may lose its authorised status.
5.2 Evaluation of SecureABC
Here we first evaluate the SecureABC system in relation to the security prop-
erties from Section 5 and then with respect our general principles from Section
2. We make the assumption that the healthcare and service providers do not
collude. Figure 5.2 summarises and compares the properties observed by the
paper-based and app-based versions of SecureABC.
Correctness: The correctness of the system is reduced to the correctness of
the signature scheme and, optionally for app-based users, the encryption
scheme used by our protocol.
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Soundness: We require that the signature scheme is EUF-CMA secure there-
fore no forgery of certificates is possible.
User-Cert-Binding: Alice is bound to her certificate by the photograph and
name that are signed by Harry. Alice would have to go to significant effort
to change her appearance and name to match that of another user, and
would also face legal and social pressure for doing so.
Uniqueness: Harry checks that to see if Alice has already been issued a
certificate in the Issue phase, meaning uniqueness is satisfied to the degree
that it is already assured for medical record keeping.
Cert-Attribute Binding: The certificate is signed by Harry using an EUF-
CMA secure signature scheme. As Alice cannot produce any forgery, let
alone one with specific attributes, she cannot modify the attributes in her
certificate.
Peer Indistinguishability
1. (Paper-based) The paper-based authentication sub-protocol provides
negligible peer indistinguishability for users. In particular, the pro-
tocol only guards against non-technical peers without the ability to
scan QR codes.
2. (App-based) The app-based authentication sub-protocol enforces mu-
tual authentication by requiring Verity to present a valid public key,
signed by the government, which has not been revoked. As Verity’s
public key is signed using an EUF-CMA secure signature scheme,
peer indistinguishability can be reduced to the difficulty of forging a
government signature.
User-Auth Unlinkability:
1. (From healthcare provider) SecureABC is decentralised, meaning the
healthcare provider is not involved in the protocol after the issue
phase. Consequently to link the user to an authentication the health-
care provider would have to collude with the service providers.
2. (From service provider) The service provider learns when a user au-
thenticates with them. If multiple service providers collude, then the
colluding group all learn the linking.
Revocation of certificates: The signed list of revoked certificate CID num-
bers rev is periodically distributed (e.g. daily) to service providers and
checked during each authentication. This means a certificate that has
been revoked cannot be used successfully. Let Harry periodically compute
and distribute rev such that it comprises all CID numbers in his private
store that have the revocation bit bCID = True. Then, for the use-cases
in Section 5.1, revocation of certificates can be realised as follows:
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1. Loss: If Alice’s certificate becomes lost or compromised, she must
inform Harry. Harry looks up her CID and sets the revocation bit
bCID = True in his private store.
2. Error: If a test result is recalled due to clinical error, Harry uses the
TID number to identify the corresponding CID in his private store
and then sets the revocation bit bCID = True.
3. Misuse: If evidence of certificate misuse emerges, a trusted author-
ity (e.g. a court) should inform Harry of the CID that was misused.
Harry sets the corresponding revocation bit bCID = True.
Revocation of service providers:
1. (Paper-based) Our paper-based authentication does not provide tech-
nically enforced revocation of service providers. This property can
only be obtained if a user is constantly educated as to which service
providers are no longer authorised2.
2. (App-based) This property is realised in the app-based authentication
sub-protocol. Authentication only succeeds if the service provider
sends the user a public key pkV that is signed by the government
and which is not on the list of revoked verifiers revV . Since the user
encrypts their antibody certificate using pkV , the verifier must have
the corresponding private key skV .
Paper-based Digital
Correctness 3 3
Soundness 3 3
User-Cert Binding 3 3
Uniqueness 3 3
Cert-Attribute-Binding 3 3
Peer-Indistinguishability 7 3
User-Auth Unlinkability by H 3 3
User-Auth Unlinkability by V 7 7
Revocation of Certificates 3 3
Revocation of Service Providers 7 3
Table 1: Security properties of our paper-based and app-based user passports.
Adherence to our general principles Here we evaluate SecureABC with
respect to the general principles we formulate in Section 2.
1. Rename, educate and revocate. Firstly, we follow our naming prin-
ciple. SecureABC provides Secure Antibody Certificates and implies nei-
ther immunity nor freedom of travel. Public education about our system
2For example it may be advertised that a certain class of services (e.g. cinemas) are no
longer authorised.
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is beyond the scope of this paper, but we do provide efficient and fast
revocation of both user certificates and service providers.
2. Access to testing and technology. We aim to reduce unnecessary
discrimination in SecureABC by providing both a paper-based and app-
based authentication protocol. This design decision ensures that access
to, or willingness to use, technology does not discriminate against certain
user groups.
3. No restrictions based on test results. Whilst this is a policy decision
rather than something that can be technically enforced, we suggest two
non-restrictive antibody certificate use-cases in Section 2.
4. Maintain user ownership of data. SecureABC is a decentralised sys-
tem in which users authenticate directly with service providers. This keeps
the user in control of when their data is used and for what purpose.
6 Implementation and Performance
In this section we review the implementation and practical considerations of our
SecureABC antibody certificate system and present the results of our reference
implementation.
QR Codes In SecureABC, users are issued signed antibody certificates which
they display to service providers using a QR code representation. QR codes are
a suitable technology for this purpose because they are a widely adopted, mature
technology that offers both machine-readability and error tolerance. There are
a range of libraries suitable for reading and writing QR codes, users understand
how to interact with them and they are resistant to wear and tear when printed.
Attacks on QR code systems are surveyed by Krombholz et al. [25].
The storage capacity of a QR code is determined by a “symbol version”
number between 1 and 40. Higher symbol numbers correspond to a greater
number of modules, and more modules correspond to higher storage capacity.
The maximum storage capacity for a standard QR code is 2953 bytes [28]. If
higher storage capacity is needed, alternative technologies such as multi-layered
QR codes [29, 33] and Microsoft High Capacity Color Barcode (HCCB) [30] are
available.
Implementation We have created an open source, reference implementation
of our paper-based antibody certificate generation and verification algorithms
which can be downloaded from https://github.com/alan-turing-institute/
SecureABC. We use this implementation to evaluate the suitability of QR codes
for this application. In particular, SecureABC antibody certificates comprise
a photograph of the user, their name, a validity period, a CID number and a
digital signature. Figure 2 shows a QR code that is output by our implemen-
tation and which comprises the optimised gray-scale user photograph as shown
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in Figure 3, the name “Alice Doe”, the validity period “6052020-16082020”,
the CID 0x1fc60e1a4e238ac6cce9d79097a268af and a valid 512-bit ECDSA
signature.
Figure 2: An example of a standard “version 40” QR code that is output by
our reference implementation.
Figure 3: An example image, generated by the NVidia StyleGAN [23], that has
been optimised to a size of 2157 bytes. This image, a name, a CID, a validity
period and a 512-bit ECDSA signature is included (with 7% error correcting
codes) in the standard QR code shown in Figure 2.
Our implementation shows that it is possible to provide both a high level
of security (512-bit ECDSA) and reasonable user-cert-binding, in the form of a
photo, using a standard version 40 QR code. Verification of antibody certificates
is highly efficient and is just the standard ECDSA verification algorithm.
7 Related work
Here we review the small number of alternative antibody certificate schemes
which have been proposed. To the best of our knowledge, all existing schemes
are either based on a centralised architecrture or propose the use of a blockchain.
A commercially available centralised immunity passport solution is proposed
by CoronaPass [14]. In CoronaPass, service providers verify user passports di-
rectly with the central service. Whilst security and legal measures can be put
in place to deter the central authority from misusing the data they hold, it
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nonetheless represents an avoidable risk and a central point of failure. Involv-
ing the central party in each authentication risks large-scale user tracking and
feature creep.
Eisenstadt et al. [17] propose an antibody certificate scheme in which
blockchain is used in conjunction with “Solid Pods” [27]. Interestingly, the
authors cite two reasons why a paper-based solution is not desirable: (a) it is
thought the virus can survive on surfaces (e.g. paper or plastic) for a number
of hours, facilitating transmission via paper-based certificates [31]; (b) for such
a valuable certificate, a paper version is too vulnerable to alteration or forgery.
In response to these concerns, we note that: (a) our paper-based solution is still
contactless, as the paper certificate is scanned by the service provider; (b) the
paper certificate is still digitally signed which negates the risk of forgery. In
[8, 1, 4] blockchain is also used to provide antibody certificate solutions. To the
best of our knowledge, blockchain is generally used in these systems as an im-
mutable ledger for recording user status’ — in particular these solutions require
verifiers to query the blockchain each time a user presents their certificate.
In the broader security and privacy literature relating to COVID-19, we note
that there has been significant debate over the merits of centralised versus decen-
tralised systems for digital contact tracing [32, 6, 9]. In digital contact tracing,
users’ phones continually broadcast ephemeral identities which are used to de-
termine which users have come into contact and risked infection. Decentralised
contact tracing systems [5] have the advantage of allowing users to compute
which interactions may have risked infection locally, denying this information to
a central authority. Analogously in our SecureABC scheme, users authenticate
directly with service providers and the healthcare provider is denied certificate
usage information.
In relation to the non-technical implications of immunity passports, and our
general principles which we present in Section 2, the Ada Lovelace Institute
published a “Rapid evidence report” [22]. The report explores how non-clinical
measures can be used to attempt to relax current governmental controls and
restrictions without an intolerable rise in COVID-19 cases.
8 Conclusion
In this work we explore the controversial technique of so-called immunity pass-
ports and present SecureABC: a decentralised, privacy-preserving system for
issuing and verifying antibody certificates. We consider the implications of
immunity passport systems, develop a set of general principles and security
requirements for their deployment and show that these may be satisfied in prac-
tice.
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